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CASES NOTED
FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION:
MORE THAN AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
A Florida employer sought review of a workmen's compensation
order of the Florida Industrial Relations Commission (IRC)I by filing a
petition for writ of certiorari. 2 The employer anticipated that the
record accompanying the petition3 would be reviewed to determine
whether there were any errors in either procedural or substantive law
and whether the compensation order was supported by competent and
substantial evidence. After considering the petition for writ of cer-
tiorari, the Supreme Court of Florida (with Justice Ervin dissenting)
held, certiorari denied: The record on review indicated no departure
from the essential requirements of law. Although the supreme court,
prior to this decision, had reviewed workmen's compensation cases as
if an appeal were being taken, it ruled that the Florida constitution did
not require that the court do so. Rather, it was held constitutionally
permissible for the Supreme Court of Florida to review compensation
orders using the standard traditionally applied in cases of review by
common law certiorari 4-"departure from the essential requirements
1. If an employee with a job-related injury is unable to agree with his employer as to a
satisfactory amount of compensation under the provisions of the Florida Workmen's Compensa-
tion Law (Florida Statutes chapter 440), he can request that the disputed claim be adjudicated by
the Division of Labor of the Florida Department of Commerce. A hearing on the claim is
conducted by a judge of industrial claims, after which a compensation order is entered, setting
forth findings of fact and the mandate. FLA. STAT. § 440.25(3)(c) (1973).
The compensation order is reviewable by the Industrial Relations Commission upon the
request of any interested party.
[T]he commission shall consider the matter upon the record as certified by the judge of
industrial claims and shall thereafter affirm, reverse or modify said compensation order,
or remand the claim for further proceedings before a judge of industrial claims who
shall proceed as the commission may direct.
FLA. STAT. § 440.24(4)(d) (1973).
2. Pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 440.27 (1973) and FLA. App. R. 4.1.
3. Rule 4.1 of the Florida Appellate Rules indicates that the record on review must contain
the record of proceedings before the industrial claims judge, any motions or other papers filed in
connection with the full commission review, and the original order to be reviewed.
4. At its inception, the common law writ of certiorari was an original writ issuing out of the
Chancery or the King's Bench which directed that the record of a cause pending before an
inferior tribunal be returned so that the higher court could review the proceedings. 10 AM. JUR.
2d Certiorari § 1 (1964). Florida and other American jurisdictions modified the common law writ
so that it is now used to review the actions of both courts and administrative bodies exercising
quasi-judicial powers. The writ issues at the discretion of the higher court and is used only to
review and quash the proceedings of inferior tribunals when they proceed in a cause without
jurisdiction, or when their procedure is essentially irregular and not according to the essential
requirements of law, and no appeal or direct method of reviewing the proceeding exists.
Jacksonville T. & K.W. Ry. v. Boy, 34 Fla. 389, 16 So. 290 (1894). Thus it is often stated that
the writ of certiorari may not be used as a substitute for an appeal. E.g., Basnet v. City of
Jacksonville, 18 Fla. 523 (1882). The Boy case, however, contained as dictum the following
statement:
A distinction is made by some courts between cases where the writ goes to inferior
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of law." Scholastic Systems, Inc. v. LeLoup, 307 So. 2d 166 (Fla.
1974).
The decision in Scholastic Systems represents the most recent
chapter in the continuing story of changes in the judicial reviewing
process for workmen's compensation cases. Prior to 1953, one could
appeal compensation orders of the Florida Industrial Commission (the
predecessor of the IRC) as a matter of right to the circuit court, and
from the circuit court to the supreme court.5 A statutory change in
19536 replaced the two appeals of right with review in the supreme
court by certiorari. The constitutionality of the statute was challenged
forthwith in Wilson v. McCoy Manufacturing Co., 7 but the change
from a mandatory to a discretionary type of reviewing process was
upheld. In doing so, however, the supreme court decided that a
reviewing procedure more extensive than that normally provided in
cases of common law certiorari was required because of the nature of
the proceedings before the Industrial Commission.
Being the order of a Commission exercising quasi judicial
powers, the Court will not only determine whether or not the
proceedings accord with the essential requirements of law,
but if found to meet this test will then determine whether or
not there is adequate, sufficient or substantial legal evidence
to sustain the findings of the Commission.8
In 1957 the reviewing authority for workmen's compensation
cases shifted from the supreme court to the district courts of appeal as
a result of the revision of article V of the Florida constitution. Al-
though the reviewing procedure in the district courts was statutorily
labeled as certiorari, the "appellate-type review"9 adopted in Wilson
courts of record, and cases where it goes to officers or boards exercising only quasi
judicial powers .... In the first class of cases it is held the record only can be examined
to ascertain whether such courts have acted within the scope of their jurisdictional
powers, while in the second the record will be examined not only to see whether such
officers or boards have kept within their jurisdictional powers, but whether or not they
have acted strictly according to law, and errors and irregularities committed by them
will be corrected.
34 Fla. at 393-94, 16 So. at 291. The dictum enunciated in the Boy decision was later adopted by
the Supreme Court of Florida in Florida Motor Lines, Inc. v. Railroad Comm'rs, 100 Fla. 538,
129 So. 876 (1930), and has remained as the law in Florida since then. It should be noted,
however, that, their statements notwithstanding, the Florida courts often treat a certiorari review
as if it were an appeal. Rogers & Baxter, Certiorari in Florida, 4 U. FLA. L. REv. 477, 493-502
(1951).
5. This system of review was thoroughly discussed and held constitutional in South At. S.S.
Co. v. Tutson, 139 Fla. 405, 190 So. 675 (1939).
6. Fla. Laws 1953, ch. 28241, amending FLA. STAT. § 440.27(1) (1951).
7. 69 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 1954); 8 U. FLA. L. REV. 139 (1955).
8. FLA. SUP. CT. R. 28(e). Rule 28 was modified by the supreme court in response to the
1953 statutory change, and the modified rule promulgated as part of the Wilson decision.
9. Prior to Wilson, questions of jurisdiction and procedure could be reviewed under tradi-
tional certiorari grounds and questions of substantive law could be reviewed under the holding in
the Florida Motor Lines case. See note 4 supra. Thus, when the Wilson case added a review of
the compensation order to see whether it was supported by substantial evidence, the equivalent of
an appeal (an "appellate-type review") for workmen's compensation cases was attained. That
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was retained.' 0 The reviewing authority was returned to the supreme
court in 1959,11 apparently because of a case overload than existent in
the district courts.
12
In 1965 the justices of the supreme court unanimously adopted a
resolution asking the legislature for relief from the reviewing authority
for compensation orders 13 because a disproportionate amount of the
court's time since 1959 had been spent in reviewing such orders. 14 The
legislature finally responded by providing for a Court of Review of
Administrative Action in the 1970 proposed amendment to article V of
the Florida constitution.' 5 The proposed amendment was defeated by
the voters, however, in the November 1970 general election, and the
crisis remained unabated. 16 A revised article V was subsequently
which distinguished this appellate-type review from an actual appeal was the element of discre-
tion. A reviewing court cannot be required to issue a common law writ of certiorari; the common
law writ always issues at the discretion of the higher court. See note 4 supra. While it is certain
that the Florida courts do exercise discretion, the criteria used in exercising such discretion is not
certain. See Rogers & Baxter, supra note 4, at 496-97. With respect to workmen's compensation
cases during the period between the Wilson and Scholastic Systems decisions, it appears that the
supreme court rarely, if at all, refused to review a compensation order, and any discretion which
it may have exercised was simply in terms of whether to affirm or reverse the IRC. See 307 So.
2d at 168, 173.
10. See, e.g., Stubbs v. C. F. Wheeler Builder, Inc., 106 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958); St.
Joe Ice Co. v. Frazier, 103 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1958).
11. Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-142, amending FLA. STAT. § 44.27 (1957).
12. The Judicial Council of Florida reports that workmen's compensation cases "were
temporarily placed in the Supreme Court in 1959, as a relief to the then newly-created District
Courts of Appeal." JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF FLORIDA, TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1967).
13. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF FLORIDA, ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1966); Levinson,
Court of Administrative Appeals: Alternatives Available to Legislature, Following Defeat of 1970
Proposed Amendment of Judiciary Article of Florida Constitution, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 261, 262
(1971).
14. The following statistics are a summary of those found in the appropriate annual reports
of the Judicial Council of Florida:
CASE DISPOSITIONS IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA (BY SOURCE)
Cert. Cert. Percentage
to to Other Total Workmen's
IRC DCA's Appeals Writs Cases Comp. Cases
Calendar Year 1962 174 274 97 366 911 19
1963 148 283 95 344 870 17
1964 171 316 127 187 801 21
1965 198 376 148 278 1,000 20
1966 263 453 130 251 1,097 24
1967 229 568 130 235 1,162 20
1968 239 556 131 251 1,117 21
1969 269 564 134 243 1,210 22
1970 193 578 136 330 1,237 16
Fiscal Year 1970-71 241 614 164 378 1,397 17
1971-72 103 611 164 295 1,173 9
1972-73 224 719 193 333 1,469 15
1973-74 228 779 192 423 1,622 14
15. S. J. Res. 36, 1969 Sess., Fla. Legislature. For a history of the efforts of the Florida
Judicial Council during the period 1966-69 and of the response of the Florida Legislature during
that period, see JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF FLORIDA, FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 2-3 (1971).
16. See generally Levinson, suPra note 13.
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approved in the March 1972 special election, but it did not include a
provision for a special court to review administrative actions. 17 Thus,
the procedure for judicial review of workmen's compensation orders
remained unchanged. Except for some statutory changes in 1972 and
1974,18 the situation which prompted the supreme court's plea in 1965
was the same which presented itself to the court in Scholastic Systems,
a decision which the court characterized as a reconsideration of the
"manner in which it could best utilize its judicial resources within the
framework of its extensive constitutional jurisdiction . "...19
The jurisdictional basis for the supreme court's review of work-
men's compensation cases is found in the constitutional clause which
provides that the court "may issue writs of certiorari to commissions
established by general law having statewide jurisdiction" 20 and the
statutory clause which provides that the IRC's compensation orders
"shall be subject to review only by petition for writ of certiorari to the
supreme court."'2' These clauses were read by the Scholastic Systems
court as providing for certiorari review in a discretionary, rather than
a mandatory, manner. The court thus reasoned that it would be
permissible to eliminate the appellate-type review which had been
provided for workmen's compensation cases since the Wilson decision
and replace it with a reviewing procedure which was in accordance
with the discretionary common law writ of certiorari. The court was
willing, however, to make this substitution only if an appellate-type
review was not "otherwise compelled by other constitutional provi-
sions. "22
In the court's opinion, there were only two constitutional provi-
sions which could possibly compel an appellate-type review. The first
provision guarantees access to the courts. 23 The Scholastic Systems
court stated in a summary manner that this requirement would be met
for workmen's compensation litigants by the certiorari review in the
supreme court, even though the review was limited to a consideration
of the "essential requirements" of law. 24 The second provision guaran-
17. There appears to be no published explanation of this omission. For example, in an
article by one of the leading proponents of the article V revision, there is no mention of the
subject. See D'Alemberte, Judicial Reform-Now or Never, 46 FLA. B. J. 68 (1972). A possible
explanation, however, might be the drastic and unexplained drop in the workmen's compensation
caseload in the supreme court during fiscal year 1971-72. See note 14 supra and JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF FLORIDA, EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 2-3 (1973).
18. See note 32 infra.
19. 307 So. 2d at 168.
20. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
21. FLA. STAT. § 440.27(1) (1973).
22. 307 So. 2d at 169.
23. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21: "The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any
injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay."
24. Although the court did not elaborate on this point in Scholastic Systems, it has discussed
section 21 in two recent decisions-Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973), and Lasky v. State
Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974). These decisions dealt with Florida's no-fault automobile
insurance statute, finding one of its sections constitutional and another unconstitutional under the
19751
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tees due process of law. 25 Florida courts previously held that due
process, with respect to the adjudicatory functions of an administra-
tive agency, requires that a hearing be held and that the right of
review by a judicial tribunal exist. 26 The Scholastic Systems court
stated, again summarily, that the hearing before the judge of industrial
claims complied with the due process requirements.
27
The question, however, which the Scholastic Systems court found
difficult to answer (and which was the point of disagreement between
the majority and dissenting opinions) was whether the review by the
IRC constituted a due process judicial review-an issue for which
Justice Ervin coined the phrase "appellate due process." Unfortunate-
ly, both the majority and dissenting opinions seem analytically weak
regarding this crucial point, perhaps because this particular issue
appears to be one of first impression in the United States.
The dissenting opinion approached this issue simply by denying
"access to courts" clause. In Kluger v. White the supreme court held that claimants could be
denied access to the courts to redress certain injuries if a reasonable alternative were provided to
them. As an example of past instances where a reasonable alternative had been provided, the
decision cited the workmen's compensation law.
Thus, it is arguable that the decision in Scholastic Systems could have been based on the
single proposition that once having been provided with a reasonable alternative to access to the
courts, a claimant should not be provided with "re-access" to the courts unless the alternative
remedy results in a departure from the essential requirements of law.
25. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law ... "
26. Permenter v. Younan, 159 Fla. 226, 31 So. 2d 387 (1947); Canney v. Board of Pub.
Instruction, 222 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
Whether the same result is demanded by the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution has never been clearly decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. Although
it has recognized on several occasions that if a full and fair trial on the merits is provided in a
court, fourteenth amendment due process does not require a state to provide appellate review,
e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956), the Court has studiously managed to avoid the issue
of whether there is a due process right to judicial review of state administrative action. See Justice
Douglas's dissenting opinion in Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U. S. 656, 661 (1973).
The Supreme Court, however, was recently given another chance to decide the ques-
tion. A petition for certiorari, claiming denial of fourteenth amendment due process rights, was
filed in the Supreme Court of the United States by a Florida employer whose petition for cer-
tiorari to review a workmen's compensation order was denied by the Supreme Court of Florida
under the rule enunciated in Scholastic Systems. Scotty's Home Builders v. Cunningham, 307 So.
2d 182 (Fla. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3652 (U.S. June 10, 1975) (No. 74-1355).
See also Slepin, Workmen's Compensation News, 49 FLA. B. J. 327, 329 (1975). Unfortunately,
the Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari. 44 U.S.L.W. 3201 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1975).
27. The procedure to be followed during the hearing before the judge of industrial claims is
specified in FLA. STAT. §§ 440.25, .29 (1973) and the WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION RULES OF
PROCEDURE. An inspection of these sections and rules will indicate that the workmen's compensa-
tion hearing complies with due process standards as explained in Deel Motors, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Commerce, 252 So. 2d 389, 394 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971):
[The concept of a due process hearing] contemplates that the party to be affected by the
outcome of the proceeding will be given reasonable notice of the hearing and an
opportunity to appear in person or by an attorney and to be heard on the issues
presented for determination. It is contemplated that the order to be entered will be
based on competent and substantial evidence adduced by the parties consisting of sworn
testimony of witnesses and properly authenticated documents bearing the required
indicia of credibility. The parties must be accorded the right to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses against them, and be reasonably heard on the contentions urged
by them with respect to the action to be taken by the agency.
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the possibility that due process might permit the exercise of "judicial"
functions by bodies other than the "courts" specified in the Florida
constitution.
28
The majority opinion, in discussing the issue, first cited the recent
promulgation of a comprehensive set of Workmen's Compensation
Rules of Procedure as an indication that the litigation before the judges
of industrial claims and the IRC had become "more judicial than
quasi-judicial.' ' 29 It then pointed to the existence of the federal article
I courts3 ° as supporting the proposition that all "courts" need not be
named in the judiciary article of a constitution. Next it quoted defini-
tions of several terms3 1 which the majority thought to be indicative of
qualities which a body exercising judicial functions should possess in
order to meet constitutional requirements. Finally, it cited two recent
statutory amendments32 which the court viewed as manifesting a clear
legislative intent to elevate the status of the IRC to that of a judicial
body. Having considered these factors, the majority concluded by
stating that "whatever its title, the Industrial Relations Commission
fulfills the requirements of a judicial body of review." 33 Unfortunately,
the persuasiveness of the majority's reasoning is lessened because the
28. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 1:
The judicial power shall be vested in a supreme court, district courts of appeal, circuit
courts and county courts. No other courts may be established by the state ....
Commissions established by law, or administrative officers or bodies may be granted
quasi-judicial power in matters connected with the functions of their offices.
29. In re Florida Workmen's Compensation Rules of Procedure, 285 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1973)
(emphasis in original).
30. An explanation of the difference between article I courts and article II courts is found in
Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 449 (1929):
Those established under the specific power given in section 2 of Article Ill are called
constitutional courts. They share in the exercise of the judicial power defined in that
section, can be invested with no other jurisdiction, and have judges who hold office
during good behavior, with no power in Congress to provide otherwise. On the other
hand, those created by Congress in the exertion of other powers are called legislative
courts. Their functions always are directed to the execution of one or more of such
powers and are prescribed by Congress independently of section 2 of Article III ....
31. The supreme court provided definitions for the terms "court," "judicial function," and
"judicial power." One of the definitions of the word "court" which it cited was:
"An agency of the sovereign created by it directly or indirectly under its authority,
consisting of one or more officers, established and maintained for the purpose of hearing
and determining issues of law and fact regarding legal rights and alleged violations
thereof, and of applying sanctions of the law, authorized to exercise its powers in due
course of law at times and places previously determined by lawful authority ....
307 So. 2d at 169-70, citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 425 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). The definition of
"judicial function" which was provided was " '[a] function exercised by the employment of
judicial powers.' " Id. at 170, citing BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 685 (3d ed. 1969).
"Judicial power" was defined as " '[t]hat part of the sovereign power which belongs to the courts
or, at least, does not belong to the legislative or executive department.' " Id. at 170, citing
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 686 (3d ed. 1969).
32. Both amendments were to Florida Statutes section 20.17(7). The first amendment was
pursuant to Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-.241, which made membership on the IRC a full-time job and
required that members of the IRC possess the qualifications of circuit court judges. The second
amendment resulted from Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-363, which required that IRC members have
the qualifications of judges of the district courts of appeal. For a discussion by the supreme court
of the 1972 amendment, before the 1974 amendment was passed, see Pierce v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 279 So. 2d 281, 283-84 (Fla. 1973).
33. 307 So. 2d at 171.
1975]
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analogy between the IRC and federal article I courts is not entirely
accurate,3 4 and because the definitions which were mentioned are
either more applicable to trial tribunals than appellate tribunals or so
generalized as to be equally applicable to all judicial or quasi-judicial
bodies.
Nonetheless, when the recent statutory changes which were cited
by the majority opinion are considered along with some factors which
it did not present, but which are mentioned by legal scholars in
discussing related issues, it appears that the majority view in Scholas-
tic Systems is the better view. 35 While there is certainly no single
answer to the question of what constitutes "appellate due process," it is
believed that a consideration of the following factors will lend addi-
tional support to the holding in Scholastic Systems: (1) the qualifica-
tions of the members of the reviewing tribunal,36 (2) the qualifications
of the members of the trial tribunal, 37 (3) whether the trial tribunal is
able to make decisions with a minimum of actual or implied influence
from the reviewing tribunal, 38 (4) whether the reviewing tribunal is
able to make decisions with a minimum of actual or implied influence
from other departments of the same agency or from other administra-
tive groups, 39 (5) whether the reviewing tribunal bases its decisions
solely on the record,4 ° (6) whether the reviewing tribunal is unable to
substitute its judgment for that of the trial tribunal, 4 1 and (7) whether
34. While article V of the Florida constitution provides that "[n]o other courts may be
established by the state," see note 28 supra, neither article I nor article III of the United States
Constitution contain a similar restriction. Thus, it was decided very early in the history of the
nation that Congress has the authority to create legislative courts. See American Ins. Co. v.
Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
35. For a differing opinion, see Levinson, The Florida Administrative Procedure Act: 1974
Revision and 1975 Amendments, 29 U. MIAMI L. REv. 617, 679 (1975), wherein the relationship
between the IRC and the recently revised Florida Administrative Procedure Act is discussed.The
Scholastic Systems court mentioned the relationship only briefly, commenting that the section of
the Florida APA which establishes the right to judicial review of administrative action "does not
modify" the section of the workmen's compensation law which provides for judicial review of
compensation orders "in any material aspect." 307 So. 2d at 169 n.3. It thus appears that it was
an unstated premise of the Scholastic Systems decision that the judicial review provisions of the
Florida APA do not apply to the IRC. As indicated in his article, Professor Levinson strongly
disagrees with this premise.
36. See note 32 supra. No other administrative officers in the Florida government are
required to possess such high qualifications.
37. The judges of industrial claims must be lawyers with at least three-years experience. The
position is full time. FLA. STAT. § 440.45 (1973). However, the 1974 version of the Florida APA
requires similar qualifications of all administrative hearing officers. See FLA. STAT. § 120.65
(Supp. 1974).
38. The Governmental Reorganization Act of 1969, Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-106, removed
the judges of industrial claims from the administrative control of the IRC. However, under the
revised Florida APA, all administrative hearing examiners are independent of the agencies for
which they conduct hearings. See FLA. STAT. § 120.65 (Supp. 1974).
39. The members of the IRC are appointed by the governor, with the advice and consent of
the Florida Senate. FLA. STAT. § 20.17 (7) (1973). Although the IRC is created within the Florida
Department of Commerce, there is no statutory control of the IRC by the department.
40. The review by the IRC is based on the record only. FLA. STAT. § 440.25 (4) (d) (1973).
This is certainly one of the distinguishing characteristics of the relationship between a trial court
and an appellate court.
41. If the findings of the industrial claims judge are supported by substantial evidence, the
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the reviewing tribunal is adjudicating rights under statutory law rather
than under regulations promulgated by itself.
4 2
When one considers the degree to which these factors are present
in the workmen's compensation structure as compared with the degree
to which they are present in other adjudicatory administrative sys-
tems, it appears reasonable to adopt the view that the IRC is closer to
a "judicial tribunal" than it is to an "administrative reviewing author-
ity." If the IRC is a "judicial tribunal," its review of workmen's
compensation orders should satisfy the requirements of "appellate due
process." Yet, even if review by the IRC does satisfy the legal niceties
of "appellate due process," the decision in Scholastic Systems may
result in an undesirable decline in the quality of adjudication of
workmen's compensation cases. This appears to be the message of
Justice Ervin's dissent-forget the technicalities of due process; work-
men's compensation claimants deserve more than the minimal stan-
dards of due process; they deserve more than a mere common law
certiorari review by the supreme court; it will be an injustice if they
are not afforded an appellate-type review by a constitutional court. If
the fears of Justice Ervin turn out to be justified, the supreme court
4 3
or the legislature4 4 can certainly respond and modify the present




IRC may not reverse, even if it would have come to a different conclusion based on the same
evidence. United States Casualty Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 55 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1951).
Florida is one of the few states in the nation which does not allow judgment substitution by the
initial reviewing authority of workmen's compensation orders. See 3 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 80.12 (1973). Under the federal Administrative Procedure Act, an
administrative reviewing body is permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder. 5
U.S.C. § 557(b) (1970). Professor Davis considers this to be one of the major distinctions between
federal administrative hearings examiners and federal district court judges. See K. DAvis,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 10.07 (3d ed. 1972). Under the revised Florida APA, however,
judgment substitution is not allowed. See FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(j) (Supp. 1974).
42. One of the initial fears which many had of administrative agencies was the lack of
separation of powers, i.e., "no man shall be a judge in his own cause." However, unlike most
other administrative agencies, the IRC is neither a prosecutor nor a legislator. Its functions are
strictly adjudicative with respect to workmen's compensation cases. Furthermore, it adjudicates
rights under statutory law, not under regulations which it has promulgated itself. This should be
compared to the typical administrative agency which adjudicates rights under regulations which
it has promulgated pursuant to a legislatively mandated program, and which may, at times, stray
from the policy which the legislature intended to promote. Thus, there is arguably a lesser need
for judicial review of the substantive aspects of the IRC's proceedings.
43. Justice Ervin, in his dissent, suggested that the supreme court should exercise its general
supervisory powers over the courts and direct that an appellate-type review be given the IRC's
compensation orders by the district courts of appeal.
44. See generally Levinson, supra note 13.
45. Although the Scholastic Systems court indicated that its review of compensation orders
would henceforth be governed by the standard of "departure from the essential requirements of
law," the phrase was never defined by the court. Presumably, pursuant to its prior decisions, see
note 4 supra, the court intended "the essential requirements of law" to include questions of
jurisdiction, procedure, and substantive law. Then, however, in the court's subsequent decision
